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international law and that  there is a principle of non-intervention in international law that is so powerful that it 
amounts to a jus cogens prohibition. 
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  [pg33] Professor Jianming ShenFN1 makes some good arguments to support his position 
that humanitarian intervention is unlawful under international law. However, his starting point is 
not one of them. He announces that there is a principle of non-intervention in international law 
that is so powerful that it amounts to a jus cogens prohibition. He bases his alleged principle on 
the United Nations Charter and the opinion of the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case. The "letter and 
spirit" of the Charter, in his opinion, monopolizes for the UN the use of force. To be sure, many 
people wanted the UN to monopolize the international use of force, but desire is no substitute for 
textual analysis. What the Charter is, and what some people want it to be, are two different 
things. The principle of the use of force is contained in Article 2(4), and the question of whether 
2(4) is so sweeping as to monopolize all international uses of force is a textual question. As for 
the Nicaragua Case, it shows the ICJ at its worst. Bereft of adversary argumentation because of 
the withdrawal of the United States, the judges wrote [pg34] briefs rather than opinions. The 
Case is a major doctrinal embarrassment for the reasons I suggested in Trashing Customary 
International Law. FN2 
 
 In this new era of concern for human rights, I am sometimes surprised by retrograde 
statists who want us to return to a Prussian conception of domestic jurisdiction that existed more 
in the positivistic theory of international law than in the actual practice of states. The positivists, 
from Bodin and Hobbes through Bentham and Austin, believed that "real law" was domestic law, 
that nations were "sovereign," and that international law was a misnomer. But none of them were 
international lawyers, and none of them understood the preceding five millennia of state practice 
where trade and travel were more important than state boundaries. The laws of marque and 
reprisal, the medieval practice of capitulations, numerous humanitarian and religious 
interventions, the doctrine of the just war, the justification of colonialism, and above all the 
"denial of justice" which even the positivistic text writer Vattel recognized as allowing 
intervention if all else fails—these are direct customary-law antecedents to what might be called 
a right of intervention. Intervention was not viewed as an exception to some other principle. To 
be sure, over the past hundred years, especially with the end of colonialism, states have 
increasingly asserted the primacy of their domestic jurisdiction over that of international law. 
They use words like "sovereignty" without understanding Hans Kelsen's powerful showing that 
international law defines the limits of state sovereignty. When writers use terms such as  [pg35]  
"sovereignty," "the dignity of states," the "inviolability of state territory," "jus cogens," and so 
forth, they are engaging in rhetoric. We should free our minds, as Wittgenstein urged, from the 
tyranny of words. International law is a matter of the careful analysis of state practice; it is too 
important a subject to be left to impassioned rhetoric. 
 
 Professor Shen appears to be one of these new statists. He joins the company of Professor 
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A. Mark Weisburd, whose article International Law and the Problem of Evil FN3 has just been 
published, and Professor Alfred P. Rubin who is a leading exponent of the primacy of domestic 
jurisdiction but, unlike many of the others, writes from considerable knowledge of the classic 
development of international law. What bothers me about the statists—in varying degrees, 
depending on the particular writer, of course—is their ultimate position that no matter what a 
government does to its defenseless citizens, so long as the depredations occur within the territory 
of the nation-state, other governments have no right to intervene to prevent it. None of these 
advocates are Holocaust-deniers, but in principle they are arguing that a nation should be legally 
allowed to slaughter with impunity a racial, religious, or ethnic minority of its citizens without 
external interference, unless by the United Nations. They seem to forget that the United Nations 
is hobbled by the veto of the permanent members of the Security Council. In my view, there are 
times of severe moral duty where any nation that has the requisite military force should step up 
and prevent the slaughter. After all, isn't this what human rights are all about?  [pg36]  After 
1945 and the Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
Nuremberg and Far East tribunals, we have been denying the impermeability of national 
boundaries. Governmental elites and their armies no longer have any right to inflict deadly harm 
upon their citizens. 
 
 Are we really supposed to shut our eyes to the killing of boys because they are Serbs, the 
raping of women because they are Muslim, the severe maltreatment of elderly persons because 
they are Croats? Do we shut our eyes because these things occur in a territorial portion of the 
planet known as, or formerly known as, Yugoslavia? Many of us are teachers of international 
law, and each year we are lucky to have classes of idealistic students. Must we teach them that a 
nation's "domestic jurisdiction" is such an important concept that it overrides their own basic 
sense of morality and justice? It was only a hundred years ago that the police and the courts in 
the United States refused to intervene to prevent husbands from battering and torturing their 
wives. The courts said that, "a man's home is his castle." When international lawyers speak of 
"domestic jurisdiction," we might read it as saying "a national bully's territory is his playground." 
Even today, some police officers are reluctant to answer "domestic violence" calls on the 
emergency phone line. But domestic violence is still violence; women and children can be 
brutalized behind the walls of a house or apartment. What would today's students think of a 
professor of international law who takes the position that the police and courts should not 
intervene in domestic disputes no matter how battered or brutalized a mother or her children 
might be? If you are unwilling [pg37] to take this position in the classroom, but you support the 
exact same thing when it happens inside a state's boundaries, then I suggest it's time to ponder 
which you value more: abstract law or innocent lives? 
 
 Of course I agree with Professor Shen that bombing was an absurdly blunt instrument to 
use for the purpose of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. The mentality behind it strikes me as 
similar to former Attorney General Janet Reno's decision to attack the house in Waco to "save 
the children," as she put it—an attack that would up with all the children being horribly burned 
to death. We should always criticize the means by which policies are executed. But it doesn't 
follow that we throw out the policy because improper means were used. You don't shut down the 
entire police department because some police officers are trigger-happy sadists. I think it's a 
remarkable thing that our military is being used to intervene in situations abroad where there are 
mass atrocities amounting in some places to genocide. It would be much easier and cheaper to 
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stay at home. But we are in a new era of consciousness where the plight of people we don't know 
makes a moral difference to us. This is a moral revolution in human civilization. We should 
applaud it at the same time that we try to improve it. 
 
 There are unfortunately some international law scholars who are statists because they 
want to curry favor with particular governmental elites. I don't for a moment suggest that 
Professor Jianming Shen is one of these, but I am somewhat distressed when I see him use the 
term "dignity" twice in the same paragraph when referring to states. In what sense does a state 
have  [pg38] "dignity"? If a state is butchering groups of its defenseless citizens, should we defer 
to the state's dignity? Should we say that all the houses in a neighborhood have "dignity" that 
requires us to admire and respect them as houses, even though wife-battering and child abuse are 
occurring behind some of their walls? When you see the films of women and children being led 
into the gas chambers at Auschwitz at the direction of the Third Reich, does the word "dignity" 
come to mind in connection with the state of Germany? 
 
 Professor Shen would like to elevate the term "dignity" to become a rule of construction 
of Article 2(4). Thus, he says that the term territorial integrity in 2(4) "cannot be narrowly 
regarded as merely referring to the inalienability of a State's territory. Rather, it refers to the 
territorial sovereignty, dignity, and inviolability of a State." Now I would like to ask Professor 
Shen how he knows this? What makes him so sure that the phrase in 2(4) "cannot" be regarded 
as one thing but rather refers to something else? Where is his support? He cites nothing in favor 
of his interpretation. But when I claimed in the book that he kindly cites FN4 that territorial 
integrity means inalienability of territory, I backed up my claim with exhaustive research into the 
meaning of the phrase "territorial integrity" covering the preceding several hundred years of 
international law usage. I cited treaties that used the term to summarize more specific provisions 
that provided for the inalienability of the signatories' territories. This research took me a great 
deal of time and effort. The research is all spelled out in a chapter of the book just cited. I found 
that "territorial integrity" was a term of  [pg39]  art in international law and diplomacy that was 
well known to most of the delegates at San Francisco who drafted the UN Charter, and should 
have been well known to any other delegates at that time who had an opportunity to comment on 
the draft of 2(4). What it meant in international law was that a state's territory must be kept 
integral—that is, no parts of it may be forcibly separated and given over to another state. At the 
time of the Kosovo bombing, I took a position on this point that was directly opposed to the 
public statements of President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair. They called for the 
independence of Kosovo. I argued on the internet that it would be illegal to intervene in former 
Yugoslavia for the purpose of securing independence for Kosovo, because such a goal would 
directly violate Article 2(4). At the NATO fiftieth-year anniversary in Washington DC, a 
statement was issued that directly supported my legal position (of course, without mentioning 
names), and if you look back and read the papers carefully, Clinton and Blair dropped all talk 
thereafter of any independence for Kosovo. I don't claim that this was much of a victory—in 
fact, not many people noticed it—but it does support the long-standing usage of "territorial 
integrity" that I found in my research on the phrase. 
 
 I acknowledged at the outset that Professor Shen made some good arguments, and one of 
them is a criticism of my position that my interpretation of 2(4) is only negative—that is, it 
allows for some non-UN military interventions. He points out that it is not positive in the sense 
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that the intervention must be based on humanitarian grounds. I plead guilty to this charge. In 
1983, I took a position that was totally contrary to  [pg40]  that of the vast majority of 
international lawyers in the United States whether they were liberal or conservative: I supported 
the legality under Article 2(4) of Israel's brief military intervention in Iraq. See Israel's Air Strike 
Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor FN5 Professor Shen regards that air strike as a violation of Iraq's 
territorial integrity, and thus he joins company with most of the international scholars who 
condemned the attack twenty years ago. However, as several of my colleagues admitted after the 
Persian Gulf War, it appeared that I took the right position on the Israeli air strike after all. If 
Saddam Hussein had nuclear missiles in 1990, would the UN have intervened to stop him? What 
would the world look like today? 
 
 Humanitarian intervention must be grounded in morality, it must be principled, it must 
not violate Article 2(4), it must defer to UN intervention (if the UN is not blocked by the veto), 
and the cure cannot be worse than the disease (on this, we haven't yet had the last word about the 
Kosovo intervention). These are all norms, rules, and principles that I have tried to spell out in 
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